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Case No. 20050720-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Mynor Armando Ardon-Aguirre,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for manslaughter, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (West 2004). This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was defendant's trial counsel constitutionally ineffective in permitting
defendant to be sentenced on the same day he entered a guilty plea and in
permitting defendant to provide his account of what led to the fatal shooting of
Oscar Arrieta?
Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,16,89
P.3d 162. However, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Rule 22(a)
Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest,
the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall not be less
than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the
court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders.
Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may
continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show legal cause why sentence should
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of
sentence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Defendant was charged by criminal information with the murder of Oscar
Arrieta. R. 1-2,51-52. Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over
to stand trial as charged. PH; R. 53-55. Defendant averted a trial on the murder
charge when, pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to an amended charge of
manslaughter. R. 53-55, 78-79, 85-94; PH. In doing so, defendant acknowledged
that on March 27, 2005, he agreed to fight with the victim later that day at a
prearranged location; he arrived for the fight armed with a .22 caliber pistol; and
1

This "Statement of the Case" includes both a summary of the proceedings
and a summary of the underlying facts, as described by the prosecutor and affirmed
by defendant when the prosecutor provided a factual basis for the plea. Because the
transcripts in this case were not paginated when the record was indexed, the July 21,
2005 hearing (where defendant pled guilty and was sentenced) is cited as "SH." The
preliminary hearing transcript is cited as "PH."
2

after being choked, he drew the pistol and fired four shots into the victim, one of
which entered the victim's back, penetrated vital organs, and caused the victim's
death. SH: 7. After conducting a rule 11 colloquy to ensure that defendant's plea
was knowing and voluntary, the trial court accepted his guilty plea. SH: 3-8.
After accepting defendant's plea, the court advised defendant that if he
"desire[d] to withdraw that plea [he] must file a written motion with the court prior
to [his] sentencing and show that [his] plea was not knowingly and voluntarily
made." SH: 8. The court then advised defendant that he had "the right to wait to be
sentenced." He was informed that the law required the judge to wait two days
before sentencing him "unless [he was] willing to waive that right and be sentenced
[that day]." SH: 8. After noting that defense counsel had previously notified the
judge that defendant wished to be sentenced that day, the court asked, "Do you
want to be sentenced today?" SH: 8. Defendant responded, "Yes." SH: 8. After
hearing from the victim's father and allowing defendant to make a statement in
allocution, the district court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of
one-to-fifteen years. R. 95-97; SH: 61. The court also ordered that defendant be
delivered to the Department of Homeland Security for deportation proceedings
after his release from prison. R. 96; SH: 62. Defendant timely appealed. R. 99-100.
Contrary to defendant's assertion on appeal, Aplt. Brf. at 6, the trial court
provided a Spanish interpreter for defendant in all but one hearing attended by
defendant. See R. 5,7,43,47,53,63,74,95. In the only hearing where an interpreter
is not identified in the record, the trial court simply continued the preliminary

3

hearing, at defense counsel's request. See R. 38-39. The minutes indicate that an
interpreter was used at the July 21, 2005 hearing, in which defendant pled guilty
and was sentenced. See R. 95; see also SH: 6 (trial court asking whether there was any
interference with the interpretation).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel because he allowed him to be sentenced immediately following entry of his
plea and his statement in allocution. Defendant's claim fails at the outset because
nothing in the record suggests that counsel did not advise defendant not to proceed
with sentencing or give a detailed allocution. Defendant's claim rests in part on the
contention that the single hearing disposition precluded defendant from his right to
withdraw his plea. Defendant, however, does not have a right to withdraw his plea.
A plea may only be withdrawn upon a showing that it was not entered knowingly
or voluntarily. Defendant has made no such showing. Defendant's claim also rests
on the contention that his statement in allocution should not have been given on the
same day of sentencing. This claim fails because such an allocution is required to be
made before sentencing. In any event, defendant has shown no prejudice. Absent
any alleged error, there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have been
given probation for manslaughter rahter than sentenced to prison.

4

ARGUMENT
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
Defendant contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective
because he permitted him to enter a guilty plea and be sentenced, "all in the same
hearing." Aplt. Brf. at 9. He contends that the single hearing disposition deprived
him of (1) his "right to withdraw his plea," and (2) his right to "be sentenced at a
time where the judge may have had more information about the Defendant, and the
emotional state of the Judge, with regard to Defendant's acts, would have had time
to wear off." Aplt. Brf. at 9. Defendant's argument is frivolous.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689
(1984). He must demonstrate that (1) "counsel's performance was deficient," and (2)
"the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. Defendant makes
neither showing.
A. A motion to withdraw the guilty plea would have been futile.
Defendant first contends that by permitting him to be sentenced immediately
following the plea, trial counsel "failed to preserve [his] right to withdraw his plea."
Aplt. Brf. at 9. He argues that he was thus "unable to reconsider his position,
withdraw his plea, and go to trial and tell his story of self-defense." Aplt. Brf. at 13,
15. This claim lacks merit.
The "withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege, not a right." State v.
Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040,1041 (Utah 1987). The purpose of allowing a defendant to
5

withdraw his guilty plea is not to enable him to "reconsider" his decision. Aplt. Brf.
at 13, 15. Rather, it "is to permit him to undo a plea which was unknowingly,
unintelligently, or involuntarily made." Gallegos, 738 P.2d at 1041. Thus, "[a] plea of
guilty... may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was
not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 2004)
(emphasis added).
In this case, defendant has made no claim that the plea was made
unknowingly or involuntarily. To the contrary, defendant concedes that the trial
court "carefully addressed the issue of whether [he] had willingly entered his plea
of 'guilty.'" Aplt. Brf. at 10. Indeed, a review of the record establishes that
defendant was fully advised of his constitutional rights to a trial verdict, as
contained in rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that he knowingly and
voluntarily waived those rights. The court's compliance with rule 11 created a
presumption that defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. See
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 11,1 P.3d 1108.
The trial court discussed the constitutional rights to a trial verdict with
defendant at the July 21,2005 hearing. SH: 3-8. During that hearing, defendant also
signed a plea affidavit, written in Spanish, that fully explained those rights. R. 8594; SH: 8. The court properly incorporated that plea affidavit. Defendant affirmed
to the court that he reads and speaks the Spanish language and that he had read the
affidavit or had it read to him at least three times. SH: 4-5. He affirmed that he
understood the affidavit and did not have any questions about it. SH: 5. He also

6

affirmed that he understood that by pleading guilty he was giving up all of those
constitutional rights, as explained by the court and in the plea affidavit. SH: 6.
Thereafter, defendant affirmed that no promises were made in exchange for his
guilty plea and that no one was forcing him to plead guilty. SH: 6. Defendant also
attested that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty. Finally, defendant
agreed with the prosecutor's factual basis for the charge, affirming that he shot the
victim four times with a .22 caliber pistol, twice in the back, causing the victim's
death. SH: 7.
Because defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty, he had no basis for
filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The law is well settled that "the failure
of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does not
constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982);
accord State v. Atkin, 2006 UT App 155, \ 15,135 P.3d 894.2 Accordingly, counsel did
not perform deficiently in allowing defendant to be sentenced immediately after

2

Counsel's decision not to act in such cases cannot be considered deficient,
nor can such failure be said to result in any prejudice.
7

entry of the plea (to the extent counsel can even be held responsible for defendant's
decision to be sentenced immediately following his plea).3
B.

Counsel was not ineffective in "allowing" defendant's statement
in allocution immediately after the plea but before sentencing.
Defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective in allowing him to

waive the time for sentencing because the judge's "emotional state," caused by
defendant's allocution, did not have any "time to wear off."

Aplt. Brf. at 9.

Defendant argues that "the trial court needed a 'cooling off period, to regain some
sense of independence from the emotion of the minute." Aplt. Brf. at 11. He
reasons that because "[j]udges are human,... we [should] presume that they need
time to absorb what they have heard and give it appropriate weight after the
emotion has faded away." Aplt. Brf. at 13. He concludes that "[cjounsel's decision
directly affected the sentence, as it put the judge in the position of having to issue a
sentence without having any time to completely shed the emotional response to a
horrible situation." Aplt. Brf. at 14. Defendant's argument lacks merit.
Defendant's argument fails at the outset because it relies on two unsupported
factual assertions: (1) that counsel "encouraged, rather than discouraged,

3

Defendant claims that the court "did not address the fact the [sic] immediate
sentencing would deprive [him] of his right to withdraw his plea and go to trial."
Aplt. Brf. at 10-11. To the contrary, the court specifically advised defendant that if
he wished to withdraw his plea, he "must file a written motion with the court prior
to [his] sentencing and show that [his] plea was not knowingly and voluntarily
made." SH: 8. Having been thus informed, defendant was well aware that in
agreeing to be sentenced that day, he would forego an opportunity to move for the
withdrawal of his plea.
8

[defendant] to be sentenced immediately following his allocution," Aplt. Brf. at 10,
and (2) that counsel made "no attempt to prevent" him from unnecessarily
incriminating himself by making a statement that "went far beyond what is required
to accept a plea agreement," Aplt. Brf. at 9. Nothing in the record supports these
assertions. As such, this Court must presume that counsel properly advised
defendant on both of these issues. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (holding that
"counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment"). 4 Having
failed to establish that counsel's performance was deficient,

defendant's

ineffectiveness claim fails.
Defendant ineffectiveness claim also fails because it confuses defendant's
statement, made pursuant to rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, with a socalled "plea allocution," which is offered to satisfy the "factual basis" requirement
of rule 11. Defendant complains that his trial counsel allowed him to give a

For purposes of resolving defendant's argument only, this Court may thus
presume that counsel did in fact discourage him from waiving the time for
sentencing and from giving a lengthy allocution detailing the events surrounding
the homicide. This presumption, however, does not suggest that contrary advice
would have necessarily constituted ineffective assistance. Indeed, there are sound
reasons for a defendant to be candid with the court prior to sentencing. As observed
by the Utah Supreme Court, continued claims of innocence after a guilty verdict
"may offend or disturb the sentencer, who must consider factors such as a
defendant's acceptance of personal responsibility and willingness to be
rehabilitated." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, f 56, 63 P.3d 621. Agreeing to be
sentenced immediately might also demonstrate a willingness to accept
responsibility without excuse.

9

statement that "went far beyond what is required to accept a plea agreement/' Aplt.
Brf. at 9. The statement, however, was not a "plea allocution" and had nothing to
do with the acceptance of defendant's guilty plea.
Under rule 11, the trial court may not accept a guilty plea unless it finds
"there is a factual basis for the plea." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(b). In this case, the
trial court asked the prosecutor, rather than defendant, to provide a factual basis for
the plea. SH: 7. After the prosecutor did so, defendant agreed that "that [is] what
happened." SH: 7. Defendant's subsequent statement, to which he now finds fault,
served a different purpose. The statement was made under rule 22(a), which
"codifies the common-law right of allocution, allowing a defendant to make a
statement in mitigation or explanation after conviction but before sentencing." State v.
Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, f 18, 79 P.3d 937 (emphasis added). 5 Defendant's complaint
that his statement "went far beyond what is required to accept a plea agreement"
thus misses the mark. Aplt. Brf. at 9. The statement was not given to satisfy the
"factual basis" requirement for taking a plea. Rather, it was given in response to the
court's allocution offer under rule 22. See SH: 13.
Under rule 22, the trial court was required to "afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement" in allocution "[b]efore imposing sentence." Utah
R. Crim. P. 22(a). Therefore, even had defendant been sentenced at a later date, his

5

Rule 22 provides: "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be
imposed." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).
10

statement in allocution still would have occurred at the sentencing hearing. The
judge thus would still be subject to the "emotional" reaction arising from the facts of
the case.
Moreover, trial counsel cannot be faulted for not "jump[ing] up and tell[ing]
the Defendant he had said enough." Aplt. Brf. at 11. The Utah Supreme Court has
held that "[allocution is an 'inseparable part' of the right to appear and defend in
person guaranteed by the Utah Constitution." Maestas, 2002 UT 123, % 48 (quoting
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Utah 1996)). The allocution decision,
therefore, rests with defendant. Counsel was in no position to prevent defendant
from exercising his "constitutionally guaranteed right to allocution" before
sentencing. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,148.
***

Even assuming arguendo that counsel's performance was deficient, defendant
cannot show prejudice. Defendant claims that "the judge may have had more
information about [him]" had sentencing been scheduled for a later date. Aplt. Brf.
at 9. However, he does not suggest what that information might be, nor does he
explain how it would have affected the court's determination. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694. The sentencing guidelines recommend imprisonment for manslaughter, even
when there are no other aggravating factors. See Utah Court Rules Annotated,
Appx. D, at 1567 (2004). Moreover, the trial court is entitled, if not obligated, to
consider the nature and circumstances of the offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3402(1) (West 2004). Defendant pled guilty to killing a man. With or without

11

defendant's elaboration, and whether sentencing occurred immediately following
the plea or days or weeks thereafter, it cannot be said that absent any alleged error,
a "reasonable probability" exists that "the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted September 1,2006.
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General

^ftrey S. Gray
^
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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